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Jill.1A.RKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA)

at the
15TH ANNUAL SILVER Q.UILL DINNER
SHERATON PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Thursday, January 27, 1906

It is a high honor to be awarded the Silver Q.uill, and, especially,
to share the award with Everett McKinley Dirksen.

The Senator from Illinois

is not only an esteemed friend of many years standing, he is also properly
identified as Mr. Republican Party in the Senate, or Mr. Republican in the
nation, or Mr. Minority Leader of the Senate.
It is in the latter role that I most frequently meet with Senator
Dirksen.

In these times of 14(b), I encounter his awesome presence not

only during my waking hours on the Senate floor but also in an occasional
nightmare.
Now we meet again this evening.

We meet not as adversaries but

as joint participants in these brief but highly literate proceedings.

In

anticipation of the occasion, I sought to find some explanation in lexicography for the phenomenon known as Everett McKinley Dirksen, Senate Minority
Leader.

In the dictionary, listed under "leader," along with more customary

definitions, there is also one which reads:
fish into a trap."
do not fish.

"--leader--something for guiding

This definition obviously does not apply to me, since I

It would, perhaps, be too obvious in the light of 14-B to state

that it might apply to the Republican leader.
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Searching further, one finds under "majority" the definition "a
group having a sufficient number of votes necessary for control."

That

does not appear to apply to the group in the Senate which calls me leader,
in any event, not within the framework of the current extended debate on
14(b). Again, it is, perhaps, too obvious to state that it is more apt as
a description of the group headed by the Republican leader since he has no
control-problem in extending the debate.
So when the two definitions are combined and put where they
obviously belong, after the name of the distinguished Minority Leader,
we find that Everett McKinley Dirksen may be defined as:

"a phenomenal

leader certainly having a sufficient number of votes to guide the fish of
the Senate into his trap ."
I must say that this definition of Senator Dirksen, accurate
as it is in the light of the current proceedings on 14-b, is not fully
satisfying.

It is not complete.

It says nothing of his immense service

over many decades to party, state, and nation.

It says nothing of the

impassioned and compelling debate he has contributed time and again to
Senate deliberations.

It says nothing of the leadership he has provided,

time and again, in international and domestic affairs.

When the chips of

patriotism are down, his have invariably been placed, before all else,
on the high interests of the nation .
was President.

It was so when Dwight D. Eisenhower

It was so when John Fitzgerald Kennedy was President.

is so with Lyndon B. Johnson, as President.

It
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The role of Everett Dirksen was, for example, decisive--and the
word is used advisedly--in the passage of the historic Civil Rights Acts
of l964 and l965.
Treaty.

His contribution, too, was great to the Nuclear Test Ban

Time and again, he has lent his vitality, his voice, his vote, to

a legislative cause which, regardless of party or personal popularity, he
deems, with deep conviction, to be vital to the nation in its domestic
tranquility, its international relations or its fundamental validity.
Everett Dirksen and I have differed many times over the years.
Our votes on the major controversial issues, more frequently than not,
show up on opposite sides of the tallies of the Senate.

Yet, as Majority

Leader, I have no hesitancy whatsoever in stating that the record of the
88th Congress and the first session of the 89th owe an immense debt to the
contribution of the distinguished Minority Leader.
cooperative and understanding participation

in~e

His has been a wise,
work of the Senate.

As

majority leader through these years I acknowledge freely that I have been
aided, although not necessarily abetted, by a great Republican leader who
is, even more, a great Senator and a great American.

HOlD FOR RElEASE 9:00 P.M.,

.

/
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ST. PATRICK'S DAY---1965

Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Given before The Irish Fellowship Club
At the Sheraton Chicago Hotel
Chicago, Illinois
Wednesday, March 17, 1965, 7:00p.m.,

C.S.T.

I am here, tonight, at the invitation of an old friend, Leo
Crowley, and I am delighted to be in Chicago for this occasion.

It

affords me an opportunity not only to join with you in the celebration
of St. Patrick's Day but also to engage in some lobbying for Montana.
It is a great state for touring and the best way to see it is by train.
In fact, I have been urging Leo Crowley, for many months, to restore
the Milwaukee passenger service in Montana.

For months, he has been

shaking his head negatively in response.
I have talked to him about human need and convenience.
been very sympathetic.

Then he has shown me cost figures and balance sheets .

I have said to him many times:
trains in Montana."

He has

"Leo, people will still ride on

He has said to me many times:

"Mike, nobody rides on

trains anymore, any place."
The stand-off has continued until now.
tonight might provide a break-through.

It would be my hope that

I want to note that I had to refuse

a speaking engagement with the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick in Butte.
Because the Milwaukee doesn't go there anymore.
Crowley's invitation to come to Chicago.
I took the B

~

0 out of Washington.

Why7

I accepted, instead, Leo
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I thought, on the basis of what Leo Crowley had said, that I
would be the only passenger.
The train was full.
So I want to say to Leo Crowley, tonight, if the B

~

0 can, why

can't the Milwaukee?
I shall not press for an immediate answer.

It would be unfair to

bind a good and long-time friend on the basis of the spirit or spirits of
St. Patrick's Day.
May I say, further, that I do recognize--sometimes reluctantly-the inevitability of change.

It is taking place not only in railroading but

in every aspect of our life.

We live in an era of vast change.

in our communities. We see it in our businesses.
technology.
it.

We see it

We see it in science and

We see it in our government and in the politics which underlies

Not so long ago, if a man attended a St. Patrick's Day celebration it

was safe to assume that he was not only a son of St. Patrick but a Catholic,
poor, and a Democrat.

Obviously, on the basis of the guest list tonight

and the magnificence of this dinner, that assumption is no longer safe on
any count.

I should add, perhaps, that I still qualify on all counts.
Where change is greatest in our lives but where we do not see it

or sense it so readily is in the world beyond our borders.

It is to that

world and our relations with it that I would address your attention for a
few moments.
I do not think it inappropriate to introduce a serious note on
a day usually given to conviviality.

It ought not to be forgotten that the
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the Saint--who is honored here, tonight, walked in a world which was
neither pleasant nor carefree.

Rather, it was a deeply troubled age in

which the rock which had been Rome had crumbled.
change .

It, too, was a time of

It was a time of chaos, born of ignorance and arrogance, of

superstition and suffering.

It was a time when an isolated and bucolic

Ireland was at last being stirred into upheaval by a birth in a stable
many miles and three or four centuries away .
And, tonight, I would remind you that St . Patrick's Day comes,
not only to Chicago and the United States but to Saigon, Viet Nam and
throughout a troubled Southeast Asia .

In that distant region, halfway

around the world from this city, there are those who will also celebrate
this day.

But the green they will wear will be the camoflauge green of

jungle warfare .

In that region, too, there is the chaos born of ignorance

and arrogance and of superstition and suffering.

There is upheaval and

change--immediate and incipient, in Viet Nam and throughout Southeast Asia .
A region of immense size is involved.

It is a region larger than the United

States and composed of as many human beings as live in our country plus
many millions more .
There, too, the rocks of stability have crumbled in these years
of our times .

The peace of the rice-fields and the quiet of the jungle

have been shattered.

A culture of many cultures, a politics of many

politics, a people of many peoples have been caught up in the fury of a
vast upheaval .
may have sought .

This upheaval is not necessarily what many of the inhabitants
But whether sought or not, they are engulfed by it and

they must live with it and work out their own destinies within its dimensions.
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Into this vast change in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia, our own
nation has been projected.

It is a recent 1nvolvement which, for a long

time, was scarcely perceptible.

Indeed, it is difficult to grasp tne

rapidity and the extent of our involvement in Southeast Asia without having
had some firsthand experience with it from the onset.

When I first visited

Southeast As1a a dozen years ago, I nad to check a map to be certain of the
capital cities of the more remote nations.

And the maps often did not

agree, so little 1nterest was there in tnat part of the world at the time.
When I visited Laos in 1953, I found two Americans--two Americans--in the
entire country and both on official assignment.

When I visited Saigon in

that same year, there were scarcely 100 Americans in all of V1et Nam,
including the North.
Now, a dozen years later, the number of Americans 1n Viet Nam-in South Viet Nam alone--is in the vicinity of 30,000 and, according to the
latest reports, there are, even now, requests from Saigon for the assignment
of additional United States Army troops.

The need for American personnel

in order to prevent a collapse in South Viet Nam has increased steadily
in the past four years.

It has increased drastically since the unfortunate

and distressing assassimtion of the one Vietnamese leader who had managed
to maintain a measure of stability in South Viet Nam--the late President
Ngo Dinh Diem.

In place of his steady hand, there has bean a succession of

hands produced by coup-on-coup in Saigon.
Many of us who have witnessed this growing involvement over the
years have been deeply concerned by it.

That is no secret.

I, personally,
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have expressed that concern many times in the past.

Yet the fact remains

that three Presidents in succession--Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson have
found no satisfactory and persuasive alternative to it.

And so far as I

can see, the prospects now are that the American involvement in Viet Nam
will deepen further before it lightens.
Let me say, in all frankness, that I do not know when and on what
terms the conflict in Viet Nam will end.

I can tell you that the President

has no intention of permitting it to end in a sudden and abject withdrawal
of American forces.

But I am persuaded, too, that it will end at some

time as all conflicts eventually end, at a conference table.

It is signifi-

cant that such public opinion polls as have been taken reflect the same view.
A vast majority of the American people express support, both, for the
military measures which the President must take and the hope for an end of
this conflict.
In short, the American attitude, insofar as it is reflected in
these indicators, was formulated originally by the late President John
Fitzgerald Kennedy.

He expressed in it--as he knew so well how to express--

the dual sentiment which resides in the heart of America.

We will do, as

Americans, whatever needs to be done to insure justice and the national
tranquility.

But we will not glorify war as an end in itself.

In VietNam,

we do not desire the sacrifice of a single life beyond what may be necessary
to bring about an equitable solution.
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There are those who say "let us withdraw" which we will
not and those who say "let's get it over now" which is not a
prescription for victory.

It is an invitation to an extended war

which will take us on a road that leads ever deeper into Asia.

It

may come to that in the end, no matter how we may seek to prevent it,
no matter what forebearance and restraint we may practice.
man can foretell.

That, no

But I can tell you that the President of the United

States who bears the terrible responsibility of decision, whose finger
is on ihe nuclear trigger, has not harkened to the siren call of easy
victory in Asia, or anywhere else.

In this respect, President Johnson

carries the same burdens as his predecessors, the late John Fitzgerald
Kennedy and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

And all of them have recognized,

under the weight of these burdens, the necessity for prudence and
restraint.
There are no quick or easy answers to the difficulties in
Southeast Asia.

But there are solutions--just solutions--if all

concerned face the realities of the situation in Viet Nam.

And the

sooner all concerned recognize these realities and are prepared to
begin an earnest search for these solutigns, the better.

The natural
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jungles of Viet Nam are extensive enough without adding to them the
manmade wastelands of war.

The lot of the people of Viet Nam--north

and south--is bitter enough without the acrid additions of a spreading
and deepening conflict.
The President has no choice but to continue on the course now
being followed unless those who have engaged us are prepared to face
these realities.

And from the point of view of our own national

interests, it is essential that we consider what it is that has prompted
us to make and to continue to make the sacrifices of life and resources
which we have borne in Viet Nam.

I would point out to you, that current

estimates place that cost at two millions a day, not to speak of the
priceless lives which have been spent and will be spent.
are not declining; they are rising.

These costs

I would point out to you, further,

that by far the largest single expenditure of foreign aid goes to Viet
Nam.
I do not want these sacrifices and, particularly, the
sacrifices of lives to go on one day longer than necessary.

I know

that you do not want that either and I am certain that the President
does not.
But neither do we wish--any of us--to abandon, half down the
road, a burden which was lifted in the interests of freedom and in our
own security.
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That is the only context in which a just peace can be sought
in Viet Nam.

And it is in that context that I ask you, tonight, to

consider the principles of our national interests in that remote region
and with the vast changes which have occurred in Asia and in the world
during our lifetime.
As a first principle, I would suggest that we seek no colonies,
or bases or any other permanent American establishment in Viet Nam or
on the Southeast Asian mainland; and what we do not seek for ourselves

we will oppose for any other outside power.
Second, I would suggest that we seek, not to dominate, but
to live in an equitable peace and in a peaceful commerce and communion

with all the people of Southeast Asia; and what we seek for ourselves

we recognize as the right of others to seek for themselves.
And, third, I would suggest that we are prepared for an end
to the use of force throughout Viet Nam at the earliest date consistent
with the right of the peoples of that region to determine their society
for themselves, free from the terror and aggression which has plagued
them for too many years.

What we are prepared to forego, we insist

that others must also be prepared to forego.
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So far as I can see, that is all we seek in Viet Nam a nd Southeast Asia and that is all we should seek in good conscience and in good
sense in that remote situation.
I wish I could tell you that Viet Nam is all that need intrude
in the way of international concern on this pleasant gathering tonight.
But I cannot, in all honesty, omit reference to the changes which are
occurring in Africa and, notably, in the Congo.

There, too, in remote and

little known places, a new era is emerging from beneath the crumbled
stability which heretofore was imposed from without.
or almost gone.

The colonies are gone

In their wake has appeared a churning mixture of

nationalism, tribalism, racialism, democracy, Communism, Islamism, and
Christianity.

And the whole is heated with the immense and oppressive

poverty of the millions of people who inhabit the continent.
Here, the American involvement is, as it once was in Indochina,
minimal, and scarcely perceptible.

Here, too, there are those, including

myself, who have expressed a concern over the years that the involvement
in Africa might deepen beyond what was necessary and a ppropriate.

Here, too,

as it is on the Asian mainland, the American interest is limited.

Here, too,
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it can be nothing more than support of African freedom in stability and of
peaceful commerce and communion with the peoples of Africa.
There was hope, not so long ago, that the United Nations would
provide an avenue through the quicksands of African change into an era of
peaceful relations.

There was a hope, not so long ago that the United Nations

would provide a buffer to insulate the emergent nations from the clashing
interests of outside powers.
the Congo.

But that hope foundered in what transpired in

And it has been assailed, again, by the organizational disarray

and the financial difficulties of the United Nations.

So I would say to you,

tonight, that unless there is a rebirth of capacity in the United Nations
to deal with these matters, the United States, along with other nations,
is likely to be plunged more deeply and more directly into the affairs of
the African continent.

The world may well face in Africa in the near future

what it now sees in the critical confrontation in VietNam and Southeast Asia.
The situation which exists elsewhere in the world is neither as
grim as that in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia nor as ominous as that of the
Congo and Africa.

The danger signs remain in the Middle Fast, to be sure.

The division of Berlin and Germany and the division of Korea are reminders of
the unfinished business of past wars which at any time may demand final
resolution.
But, there is another side of the coin.

In Latin America, for

example, the Cuban experience--shattering as it was--has not been repeated
elsewhere.

The Alliance for Progress which was set in motion by the late

President Kennedy has been continued with vigor under President Johnson.

..
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It has been, by all reports, most effective and most helpful in assisting
the Republics to the south to strengthen their stability and to accelerate
their progress.

Some of the Latin American nations, notably Mexico, have

scored enormous economic advances.

And as this progress has become manifest,

our commercial and other relations with that nation have benefitted greatly.
In Western Europe, there has been a sustained stability and
economic advance.

On the other side of the continent, the eastern Europeans

are obviously exerting a greater degree of independence than at any time
in recent memory.
These changes for the better are of immense importance to all of
us.

Western Europe is no longer as it was, scarcely 15 years ago, totally

dependent on us for its survival in freedom.

Eastern Europe is no longer

automatically responsive to the call of Soviet ca:m:nand.

Indeed, even Albania,

not to mention Yugoslavia, is capable of ignoring that call and others, if
they cannot yet say "no", can at least say, "yes, but •••. "
For us, these changes infer the need for continuous adjustment in
our policies within the basic design of our relations with Europe.

I am

hopeful that we will retain a close communication with Western Europe and,
to that end, do whatever can be done to close the unfortunate breech in
warmth and understanding which has opened with France.

At the same time, I

would also hope that we might continue to lighten the burden of expense for
the defense of Western Europe which we have borne in a somewhat one-sided
arrangement since the end of the war.

And the same would apply in the matter of
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foreign aid, at a time when Europe is generally in a good position to share
these costs in a more equitable fashion.
And I would suggest, finally, that if we are to make the adjustments which are necessary in this era of change that we abandon, at last,
the cliches of isolationism or internationalism.
of the nation in these critical times.

Neither can meet the needs

There is no turning back the clock.

But neither is there any virtue in keeping the hands of the clock ahead of
the actual time.
It is not isolationism or internationalism to consider the principles
of a just peace in Viet Nam even as we pursue the bitter conflict in which
we have become involved and with which we must stay until that peace is
achieved.

It is connnon sense and sound national and international interest.
It is neither isolationism nor internationalism to consider other

means--through a restored and reorganized and financially stable United
Nations, if that is possible--to avoid a series of Viet Nams in Africa.

It

is connnon sense and sound national and international interest.

It is not isolationism nor internationalism to consider ways of
diffusing the burdens of responsibility and costs which we still carry,
largly in a one-sided fashion for the defense of the West and for foreign
aid at a time when we are in balance-of-payments difficulties and Europe
has a greater capacity than heretofore.

It is common sense and sound national

and international interest.
These, then, are the thoughts which I would leave with you tonight.
And I would ask you for patience and trust of the President, whose burdens are

- 13 -

great as are those of any President.

I would ask you to think through

these immensely difficult questions of foreign relations so that you will
understand what it is that confronts him.

I would ask you, even when you

differ with him, to appreciate that he is acting, as God gives him the
capacity, in the interests of the people of the nation and for the peace
and security of all of us.

MAIN FILE COPY
DO NOT REMOVE

rch 31, 1

s
CHA

,

,
and -

1

of

rel iv

1

hi s

0

ny

ri n

which

co1le

1

of

i

s

in
bl

s

or,

1o

xico hich h lo d

Sa

cerved

w

1

all of u

ll

s

erv in

of

11

ndnv:rc

lw a c pl

co ribu ion, h

bri

from in he nation,

e pl ce

hat he has passed hi

Wlcy'

r

ibr

c

/

~

an left hie

rk.

I

hole bcfo

hi con 1nui

ve

on.
o~ ,

ion hich h

ll,

0

~0

who

ond th

and in eo doing, 1

d dio-

up

1nguished career hn 1

ol ,

hi

oil o

n ur

c

0

fr
rue oon of

J

din 11

1n

I

rien

o honor

ChQv z .

It t 11 us

It

11
t hi

UG

pee· al contribu ·iu l

ws a

o the na ion from l e 1 ey· co.

Dennio Cha cz brousb to
gifts of co •rage and de

made life nnd
e

1y

ruggl

enr"che by

co.t o •

pove:r y .

ou o

the 1 on ol' 1 is self-

-fortuna+

born of his

1

o he Senate,

ese gif

ion hrough

1·

d.:ne and. fo T.-nal

w.

He 1r pped hcs
r.

He brough

He bro gh ·

pro ound cl -educ

the rare personal

vcn

or he ·

c

cauca on in ·h

Per h

~he

vez c

Dennie

n a unique cul rol contribu ion .

€-

adi ·on, several

e ou of the

"' •
•
•
• ~ - 1 l "' , ,
... 1
d COUI'ClgCOUS
~~~~~~
f"ldi
.
,.
.
nn .;
+o
r ....
"'~ ' A .
'· '
I. _.. .. '
I
... •
~:""'""
'J

-

h s perso

d 1..,

of vh
Un

cultur of ..he

d S

z i

So Dcnni
He i

1

honored for B

~

honor d
rvice ,

nd as an ou o nding Am ric n .

o in
s

by

exican,

io replica.

~

s

Senator,

MAIN FILE COPY
DO NOT REMOVE

)

. c.
' l:

•

to

It 1

'

other than my own,
ich

from th

s

•

q

ot the

l

t I

ivi

thi

behalf.

ri

to

ic

stand in
by thew

the

1can

.xic
irit .

'

and to the

- 2 -

It has
former

country ( and may I say th t my es

-Pr sident

for/

lfo Lopez

Nateos and Pres1d t Gustavo Diaz Ordaz is of the highest), but also
numerous Mexican parliamentariEI.n who, like tho
and th Hou e of

this

epresentati

at experienc

ys~

ch other '

s, come trom all walks Of life.

of th U . •

parli1111ent ian of bo

of us in the

exican arli

~

Ue th1

expre sion o that

more.

tu&l1ty of national re

tween

formed

e United.

ympathy, and fore-

tate

e.xic •

an

It h

and to

Ordaz . as well as to their immediate predecessors.

e

llOV

tr1ve to

i

intain

It will require a continuinS and expand

nations, cot only on

e pu-t of

As I loO to

e

epublic of exico

ture,

thas

!'fort on th
and

n achieved.

art of both

aidents A Parliamentariana ut,

even more, on the part ot all vbo 11v on

that the

t,

• Kennedy aDd Lyndon B. J ohnso

teo

I see it

tio s owe lllUCh to

In this respect, the two

Lopez

h other ' s

reci ted on

a ard is eeply

personal basis, I look upOn it, too,

iaenhower, Job

'

rec1ate

needs, each other ' s upectancies .

Mr.

bearance which h

Through

ntary

countries ave come to

en te

•

th

ide of

assador, I

e border .

:ve very coni' ence

the Rep blic of the United tate Will

t relationship out of their two d1verse heritages aad

MAJN F1LE COPY

OONO'{~
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. MONT)
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THE ARMORY, MAY 12 , 1966
7:00 p. m.
Washington , D. c.
On behalf of the Democratic Senators standing for reelection
- all of whom will be reelected - in November, I thank you.
I thank you, too, on behalf of the new Democrats who will
be in the Senate next January.
Finally, I express the appreciation of all Senate Democrats
to the Senate Democratic Campaign Committee - to Chairman Magnuson,
Vice Chairman Dan Inouye, and to their colleagues and to their fine
staff headed by Mattie Matthews and Fred Lordan.

The Committee has made

a great contribution, tonight, as it always does whenever an opportunity
presents itself in any way, shape, or form to help Democratic Senatorial
candidates.
There

~

political campaigns.
tice.

be better ways than over-priced dinners to finance
Same day they will be devised and put into prac-

Until they are, however, these dinners are under-priced at any

price, because they are essential to the political life of the nation.
It remains a fact that a little steak goes a long way.

And

tonight it goes a very long way.
It goes towards continuing the high caliber of the recent
Congresses into the next Congress.
It goes towards assuring President Lyndon B. Johnson of the
great legislative cooperation that he has had into the next two years.

I

•

-2-

Tonight, we can look forward to another Democratic Congress
in January.

Even greater Democratic majorities in the 90th Congress

are within sight.
Certainly there are no signs now visible in the nation's
economy which point to the defeat of Democratic Congressional candidates
in November.

There are many indications in the nation's economy which

point to the election of additional Democrats.
There are no issues in the President's programs of civic
advance which point to the defeat of Democratic candidates.

There are

already many achievements under those programs which redound to the
credit of the Democratic party.

You know the list.

Medicare, civil

rights, educational aid, anti-poverty, air and water pollution control,
social security increases, GI benefits, and a dozen others designed for
the welfare of the nation's people.

And before this session is out,

the list will be larger.
In short, the ......_.._._. effectiveness with which recent
Democratic Congresses have met their legislative responsibilities for
the social welfare of the nation recommends to the people the addition,
not the subtraction, of democrats from the next Congress.
Where, then, are the clouds on the horizon?
the concerns of Democrats for next November?
~ ~ ~ .~

about Viet Namr

It is there.

.1;

What, then, are

Let us be blunt.
~~ ·~

WhatJ 1

f~JL-r

.,. - £+<(

With the best of bi-partisan intentions

- and some are not the best - it is not going to be kept out of sight
during the months ahead.

With the best of bi-partisan intentions - and

same are not the best - it is not going to be swept under a political
rug during the next few months.

0 , _

l

i?

~
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The truth is that Viet Nam is the question of fundamental
concern to the people of the United States.

And any question which

concerns the people deeply; concerns every Democratic candidate for
Congress.

The issue must be faced and met in the coming campaign.
What I want to say to you tonight is that Democrats need have

no fear of this issue.

Democrats in this Congress have no apologies

whatsoever to make on the question of Viet Nam.

Democrats, however, do

owe the people of the United States an open discussion of this question
in the coming months.

And so, too, may I say, do Republican candidates.

The public is entitled to know what a Democratic Congress thinks about
Viet Nam.

The public is entitled to know in what way a Republican

Congress would think differently and what it would be likely to do
differently.
There will certainly be discussion of Viet Nam in the coming
campaign.

For the good of the nation, beyond party, one can only hope

that it will be honest and straight-forward discussion.

For the good

of the nation, one can only hope this discussion can be pursued with a
decent restraint.

One can only hope that it will reflect a due regard

for the great and final responsibilities of the President of the United
States.
There are differences of view among Democrats in the Senate
on Viet Nam.

They have been expressed time and again, and they will

continue to be expressed while the issue remains unresolved, while peace

:.

.
- 4-

remains disestablished.

There also are differences of view among

Democrats in the Senate on civil rights, poverty, or whatever among
the programs of the Administration.

These differences, too, have been

expressed. And there have been differences among Democrats on every
major issue which has confronted the nation in my recollection.
these, too, have been expressed.

And

Indeed, some of these differences

have gone far deeper than those on Viet Nam today and have been expressed
with greater vehemence.
Have these differences wrecked the party1
in the end, they have strengthened it.

On the contrary,

Within the framework of this

party there has been and there is, now, room for diversity on any issue.
And as we mean to keep this party strong and vital, we will see to it
that the door is kept open to diversity of view, whether it is on issues
sectional, ideological, or international.
I say to you, moreover, that on Viet Nam there is more, far
more, convergence among Democrats in the Senate than divergence.

Bear

in mind that not a single legislative measure pertaining to Viet Nam
which the President has sought beginning with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,
has not passed and passed with a great majority.

Bear in mind that,

reciprocally, the President has been receptive to and has tried eagerly
to pursue many of the suggestions of members of the Senate which offered

some promise of peace.
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President Johnson has the sympathy of every Democrat in the
Senate in his great responsibilities for foreign relations.

Whatever

independent views may be held on Viet Nam, however vehemently they may
be expressed, Senators know, as you know, and as the American people
are beginning to find out that we are dealing with the most complex,
baffling, and uncertain situation ever to
a.Jm'IQ.

::.. f>v- cJ_,.

confront ~the

~-

United States .

They know, as the President knows, and as you know, and as

the American people are beginning to find out that there are no sure
('tV'

c~ ~

1

cures, ~no easy exi.ts from the morass.

The truth is that there are no experts on Viet Nam who can
show a simple way, either to victory or to a just peace.
only degrees of inexpertness.

There are

That is true in the agencies of govern-

ment, no less than in the academic world or in the Congress.

The

President is seeking the best advice and counsel from wherever he can
get it in his search for solutions.

On the basis of that advice, he

is straining every fiber of mind and heart to set the course which may
lead to a just and honorable peace in Viet Nam.

Every Democrat in the

Senate knows of the energy of that effort, and every Democrat in the
Senate fully sympathizes with the President in that effort.

J •

-

...

'
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We go into the campaign knowing that the President and the
Democratic members of the Congress each have their individual responsibilities on this issue even as they have a collective responsibility
to the nation.

In that light, we go into this campaign--all Democrats--

with the conviction that another great Democratic Congress working with

th~~leadership of President Lyndon B.

Johnson is the best hope,

not only for a just and satisfying society at home but for the achievement
of a reasonable and honorable peace in Viet Nam at the soonest possible
time.

Rv~

~

~
}v~

rlv r"'Y-/
?*
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VIET N.AM AND CHINA
THE SHADOW OF WAR--THE SUBSTANCE OF PEACE

I welcome the opportunity to share this day with the Class of

1966. For the most part, you are among the last to have been born during
'i-J'orld War II.

Hence, you are among the first to have received the pledge

of peace of the United Nations in 1945.

The preamble to the Charter, you

will recall, contains this solemn statement of purpose:

"To save succeed-

ing generations from the scourge of war."
The pledge has stood for twenty-one years.

Commencement

addresses this year might well ponder the adequacy of its fulfillment.
It is a fitting theme for graduating classes, not only in the United
States, but in the Soviet Union, China, France, Britain, and elsewhere.
The Class of 1966 has been witness, since birth, not to a growing peace in the world, but to a procession of crises and conflicts.
This class has come to maturity in an atmosphere which for two decades
has been heavy with war and the threat of war.

This class graduates

directly into the face of the bitter war in Viet Nam.
Yet the words remain:
~eonrge

of war."

"To save succeeding generations from the
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The detonation of the first atomic bomb gave to these words a
great fervor in
later.

1945. The pledge is even more compelling two decades

Today, nuclear weapons, thousands of times more powerful, are

stocked in the arsenals not only of the United States, but of the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, France and, perhaps now, China.
At this moment in time, peace is more than an ideal and a hope.
It is a universal and urgent human necessity.
The problem of peace is the great preoccupation of the President
and of the Senate.

It is a problem, unfortunately, which grows more, not

less, difficult with each passing day.

Indeed, with respect to Viet Nam,

we have scarcely begun to delineate the path to peace.

We have yet, after

extraordinary efforts, to begin to devise a formula for the resolution of
the conflict.
During the past year, the effort has been made to end the war
by waging more war and it has not succeeded.

For a time, the effort was

made to end the war by waging less war and that, too, did not succeed.
The President has pursued negotiations in public.
them in private.

He has searched for

He has sought a conference on peace on every highway

and by-way of international diplomacy.
But peace remains elusive.
not in sight.

The end of the war in Viet Nam is

The question of Viet Nam continues to command our most

persevering thought.

It continues to demand a most honest, restrained

and thorough public discussion.
We owe an unremitting search for a peaceful solution in Viet
Nam to the young Americans who have gone and who will go to that tortured
land.

We owe it to the Vietnamese people who have suffered from the war
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in great multitudes and beyond imagining.

We owe it to our individual

consciences and to the collective conscience of the nation.
Therefore, I address your attention, today, to the problem of
peace in Viet Nam.

I ask you to consider this problem in the context of

the limbo in which, for more than a decade and a half, have reposed the
relations between China and the United States.

The two questions--peace

in Viet Nam and peace with China--are very closely interrelated, if not,
indeed, inseparable.
In a direct military sense, it is true that China is not presently
involved in Viet Nam.

We have, in fact, bent every effort to assure the

Chinese that we mean them no harm and that we have no desire to share this
conflict in Viet Nam with them.

We have, in short, sought to avoid military

engagement with China and, except in accident, so far have avoided it.
Nevertheless, China is involved in Viet Nam.

Chinese participa-

tion is largely indirect, but it is nevertheless a real participation.

It

takes the form of encouragement of Hanoi and the National Liberation Front
in the south.

It includes the supply of war materials which are used

against Americans and other supporting assistance.
There is also already an element of direct Chinese participation
in Viet Nam.

Large Chinese labor battalions are at work along the overland

routes which come into North Viet Nam from China.

Americans have been shot

at and shot down by China, as the war in the air over North Viet Nam has
skirted the Chinese borders.
prevails.

That is the sort of involvement which already

There is every probability, moreover, that the longer the war

goes on, the greater will become the extent of Chinese participation.

As

time goes on, an escalating war tends to take on its own relentlessness.
One-by-one the hatches of avoidance shut down for all concerned.
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If the Chinese are linked ever more tightly to the continuance
of the war in Viet Nam, it seems to me that they are also tied inextricably
to the question of peace in that nation and in Asia as a whole.
consider those matters, however, later in my remarks.

I shall

Let me turn, first,

to the inner problems of Viet Nam.
Events of the past few weeks lend to the war an air of bewildering ambiguity.

It is not surprising that they engender a great deal of

confusion and uncertainty in this nation.
We are engaged in war against the North Vietnemese, the Viet
Cong, and the National Liberation Front of the south.

But the elements

of leadership in South Viet Nam who have the greatest stake in that effort
are engaged in a quasi-war amongst themselves.

This inner conflict has

produced pressures for instability in the south which have little to do
with the war in which we are

engaged~

In the light of these pressures,

it is unrealistic to describe the situation in South Viet Nam in a clearcut ideological context.

It has never been, in fact, that kind of simple

situation.
To view the conflict as wholly one of an aggression of the north
against the south also does not do adequate justice to the perplexing
realities of Viet Nam.

The war is more than a clash between two nations

or hostile strangers.

It is also a rending of long associated cultures,

north, central and south, which contain relatives, friends and enemies
for whom the 17th parallel is a division of dubious significance and
durability.
It is illustrative, in this connection, to note that the leader
of North Viet Nam, Ho Chi Minh, was born much farther south in Viet Nam
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than the present leader of South Viet Nam, General Nguyen Cao Ky.

Ho Chi

Minh, the communist, was educated extensively in what is now anti-communist
South Viet Nam, while Nguyen Cao Ky, the anti-communist, received his training in what is now communist North Viet Nam.

And if that leaves you con-

fused, think for a moment what it must do to the Vietnamese people who must
live with the confusion.
What I am suggesting by this digression is that while Viet Nam
may be two Houses in conflict, it is at the same time one House not only
divided, but also united in many ways.

What I am suggesting, too, is that

events of the past few weeks represent the surfacing of but a few of the
complex difficulties of the Vietnamese situation.
It seems to me that these difficulties have grown more intractable
and the solutions more difficult since the tragic assassination of President
Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

Coup has followed coup until the count has been lost.

In the process, the leadership of South Viet Nam has been sundered and
weakened, the rivalries have grown, the mutual antipathies have increased.
And, in the process, the Vietnamese people have suffered greatly in consequence of these developments as well as from the war.
In all frankness, so, too, has this nation suffered from these
developments.

The instability amongst the South Vietnamese leaders has

meant a steady increase in our involvement in Viet Nam, and especially
our military role.

There is no question that the Armed Services of the

United States have provided a growing margin of power without which a
Republic of Viet Nam could not have survived.

To them has fallen the

task of filling the defensive gap left by the growing strains on the
South Vietnamese authorities.

On them has fallen the principal burden
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of meeting

t~e

increased military pressures from the

These tasks

no~th.

which have been assigned to them by the nation's policies have been discharged with great dedication and at great
The

inc~ease

in the American

will continue to be very costly.

person~

effo~t

sacrifice .

in Viet Nam has been ani

During the past year and a half, our

ground forces commitment has grown from about 25,000 to 267 1 000.
end, this figure will be much higher.

By year's

The deployment of American naval

and air power has been of a very great magnitude.

It has brought to bear

on Viet Nam the impact of tens of thousands of additional highly trained
~en

who have unleashed a level of destructive power which may approach or

even surpass that which was set loose during the Korean war.
At the beginning of 1965, the United States fcrces were incurring
casualties at the rate of about 6 per week.
are killed and wounded each week.

Now, upwards of 500 Americans

For the past five or six weeks in

succession, the casualty rate for Americans has surpassed that of the
South Vietnamese armed forces.
In monetary terms, the current cost of Viet Nam to the United
States has been estimated at an annual rate in the neighborhood of $13
billion and is continuing to rise.

In early 1965, the costs were perhaps

$1 or $2 billion.
I wish that I could tell you that this powerful injection of
American resources had brought the war nearer to a conclusion.
can only repeat what I said at the outset of my remarks:
war in Viet Nam is not in sight.

1

But I

the end of the
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It has been suggested of late--perhaps inferred is more accurate-that the war can be ended quickly by a further expansion of the American
military effort and, particularly, by more and better-placed bombing.
That is an appealing suggestion, and I have no doubt that it will be heard
more frequently between now and November.

It wraps up, in one simple

thought, a criticism of the present political leadership, a promise of a
less painful war, an expectation of victory at a relatively small increase
in cost.

In short, it suggests that there is an easy exist.

score one point, here, today:

Let us under-

There are easy ways to plunge more deeply

into this situation; there are no easy ways out of this situation.
I have just illustrated the extraordinary expansion of the
American military effort--including bombing--in the past year and a half.
Before going further along that path, it would seem to me that we have a
great responsibility to pause and, first, consider carefully the point to
which this path has led.

I can assure you that the politically responsible

leadership of the nation in the person of the President is not unmindful
of this responsibility.

There is, indeed, a most profound concern as to

where this course has led and where it may yet lead.
~Vhen

the sharp increase in the American military effort began

in early 1965, it was estimated that only about 400 North Vietnamese
soldiers were among the enemy forces in the south which totalled 140,000
at that time.

Today, the overall size of the enemy in the south has in-

creased to 250,000 of whom at least 30 1 000--a very conservative estimate-are considered to be North Vietnamese regulars.

One source suggests that

if local Viet Cong battalions which operate within their own provinces
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are excluded from the total, the northerners make up approximately onehalf of the disciplined professional enemy soldiers in South Viet Nam and
may well constitute two-thirds by year's end.
Shortly after the outset of the expansion of the military effort,
it was believed that about 1,500 North Vietnamese were crossing the border
each month.

Just a few months ago, the maximum potential infiltration was

thought to be about 4,500 per month.

But infiltration has recently been

reported in the press to be at a current rate well in excess of this figure.
The field of battle was confined largely to South Viet Nam when
the expansion of our military effort began.

Air and sea bombardment has

now extended the arena of conflict throughout almost all of North Viet
Nam.

The war has spread sharply into Laos.

More and more, it verges on

Cambodia and threatens to spill over into Thailand.

And as I have already

mentioned, American planes have been shot at and shot down on or across
the borders of China.
Whatever constructive achievement has resulted from this expansion, the fact must also be faced that the search for peace by intensification of war has begotten, not peace, but a further intensification of war.
The expansion of the arena of conflict has yielded, not peace, but further
expansion of the arena of conflict.
Is the war, then, to continue to intensify?

Is Viet Nam--north

and south--to be reduced to a charnel house amidst smoking, silent ruins?
Indeed, is that to be the fate of great areas of Southeast Asia and regions
beJQnd?
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Experience requires us to recognize that this danger exists in
the conflict.

Prudence compels us to recognize, moreover, that the

terminal point may not be reached until and unless the war has involved
China directly.

That possibility, it seems to me, should be faced sooner

rather than later.

We should examine it, now, while there is yet time to

examine it in good sense and soberness.

We should examine it, now, rather

than wait until the actuality is confronted in the heat of some accident,
miscalculation or misunderstanding or at the end of that long drift which
ends in inescapable military convergence.
Certainly, the experience of Korea counsels us to examine this
question without delay and, in so doing, to lay aside the distorting prism
of wishful thinking.

It will be recalled that a war between Koreans--

north and south--a decade and a half ago,
expected at the beginning.
United States and China.

beca~e

in the end what few

It became, substantially, a war between the

And you will recall, too, that in the end peace

was not restored to Korea by victory but by a truce which required the
agreement of the United States and China.
The question must be asked here as well as in Peking .
be asked now.

It must

Can peace be restored in Southeast Asia, as it was not in

Northeast Asia, before, rather than after, a military clash?

Can there

be a turning off from the course of collision and onto the road of settlement before, rather than after, the crash?
I can give you no assurances on these questions.

The answers

depend not only on our wdsdom and restraint but also on that of the
Chinese.

I can only stress to you that the relentless search for affirma-

tive answers is a most solemn responsibility which rests especially upon
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the leadership of this nation and of China but concerns also the United
Nations, the Geneva powers, and the entire world.
There is little doubt that this search is hamoered by the long
hiatus in United States relations with China.

It is a decade and a half

since the Chinese revolution and the Korean conflict which followed it.
In all these

yea~s,

little of consequence was done to close the deep void

which these shattering events blasted between the peoples of the two nations.
On the contrary, the seeds of hostility and suspicion were scattered widely
and in both countries.

The weeis of a mutual distrust were encouraged to

grow high in both countries.

The direct human contact between the world's

most populous nation and the world's most powerful was reduced to formal
and routine meetings in Warsaw between an American and a Chinese Ambassador
>vhich, over the years, have averaged out to about one a month .
In the last few weeks members of the Administration have sought
to make clear in public statements that this nation seeks to restore some
"bridges" to China.

That is a helpful initiative.

It is also useful to

lower our rigid self-imposed travel and other barriers which the Executive
Branch is now doing.
These acts accord with the nation's interest and they are most
certainly meaningful gestures in the direction of peace.

That the Chinese

greet these efforts with unabated hostility does not change their validity.
In the present state of Chinese-United States relations, all acts are
suspect.

All doubts are magnified.

All fears are exaggerated.

These

acts, nevertheless, remain proper and modest acts which may one day
redound to the benefit of both nations.

That is all they are and they

ought not to be regarded as anything more.
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They d.o not, certainly, go to the core of the current danger
which lies in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia.

Indeed, the relevance of these

acts must necessarily remain dubious, at least until that danger is faced
and begins to abate.
~fuat

is needed most, at this time and in the light of that danger,

is an initiative for a direct contact between the Peking government and
our own government on the problem of peace in

V~et

Nam and Southeast Asia.

This problem is of such transcendent importance, it seems to me, that it
is a fit question for face-to-face discussion between China and the United
States at the highest practicable level.

Our Secretary of State, Dean

Rusk, confronted the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, across the
Conference table at Geneva in 1961-62.

It may be that a similar meeting

now would be useful in this critical situation.
The meeting could be confined to the two nations, or it could
include all the belligerents in Viet Nam.

It could include the nations

of the Southeast Asian mainland since they all lie in the swath of the
war's spreading devastation.

It seems to me that there are many possible

and acceptable alternatives insofar as participation and arrangement are
concerned.
The membership and mechanics of the conference are not key issues.
History will not be gentle with those who
substance of peace .

purst...~

the shadm• and evade the

It will not view with sympathy those who stand too

much on ceremony or who insist too much on face as the price of coming to
grips with its profound problems .
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An Asian confer.ence, at this time, cannot draw a distinction
between victor and vanquished in this conflict, any more than it was
possible to do so in the Korean settlement.

All win by peace; all lose

by the war 1 s continuance.
What a conference at this time must be concerned with is, in
the first instance, a curb on the expansion of the war and a prompt and
durable termination of the tragic bloodletting in Viet Nam.
It must be concerned with insuring a choice free of coercion
of any kind to the people of South Viet Nam over their future and on the
question of the reunification of Viet Nam.
It must be concerned with how the independence and the territorial
integrity, not only of Viet Nam, but of other small nations of Southeast
Asia can be safeguarded in peace.
It must be concerned, finally, with how foreign bases and
foreign military forces can be promptly withdrawn and excluded from
Viet Nam and other parts of the Southeast Asian mainland.
These are fundamental questions.
must begin to be found.

Answers to these questions

And, in the last analysis, they must be con-

curred in by China and the United States.

Those are the essentials if

the conflict in Viet Nam is to end and if a reasonable and stable peace
is to be established in Southeast Asia.
Let me make clear that I am not sanguine as to the possibilities
that these questions will be faced in conference in the near future.

Even

less is it to be expected that answers to these questions are going to be
found very quickly.

The chasms are deep.

The walls are high.

- 13 -

Nevertheless, at some point, these questions will have to be
faced and answers will have to be found.
continue to

t~y

It s eems to me that we must

to take those first faltering steps toward peace in Asia.

We must try to take them, now, before the tragedy, which is Viet Nam, is
compounded many times over.
on the Chinese.

That is the great responsibility.

It rests on this nation.

nations of the world.

It rests

It rests, finally, on all the
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nist China tod.,Y rejected Sen.
Mike Mansfield's proposal for
Chinese-American talka on
Vietnam at the Foreign Ministers' level.
A foreign Ministry spokesman, asked to comment on the
' Senate Democratic Leader's
proposal that Secretary of
State Dean Rusk and Chinese
Foreign Minister Chen Yi
meet to discu.ss ways of ending
the Vietnam confilct, said the
question arose solely because
of the U.S. "war of agcression"
in Vi'etnam.
Tliis aggression has to stop
and all United States forces
must be withdrawn from South
Vietnam, the spokesman said.
He added that "to say that
a settlement of the Vietnam
question can be negotiated be·
tween the Foreig~M'nisters of
China and the Un'
States
is entirely an atte pt to cover
up the present
!ted States
effort to expan its war of
aggression against Vietnam."
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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WA S HI NGTON

/

August 10, 1966

/

Dear Mike:
The start of construction of Libby Dam is an
event of national and international significance.
I remember that on many occasions during my
years in Congress we discussed the desirability
of this project as a further means of controlling and storing water on one of the greatest
river systems in the world.
We authorized its construction during those
days. Its beginning, however, depended upon
a treaty with Canada for mutual development
and benefit from the waters of the Columbia
River and its tributaries. Only when such
a pact was negotiated could Libby Darn be
built to its most efficient height, which
would back water over the border into Canada.
Consequently, it was with great personal
pleasure that as President I was able to sign
the treaty with Prime Minister Pearson at a
ceremony under the Peace Arch joining our
two nations. This agreement made possible
not only Libby Dam, but three storage projects
in Canada.
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I compliment our good northern neighbors for
promptly undertaking con s truction of the dams
on their side of the border . Now the United
States is movins on schedule to fulfill our
part of the bargain.

I am delighted, too, that Congress has authorized construction of the Third Powerhouse at
,..
Coulee Dam. This also is a direct result of ' ·
the treaty.
Thus, two great nations of the Western Hemisphere are working together to develop their
joint resources. It is in the same spirit of
peace and coop eration among men of good will
that I extend best wishes to all who are participating in the groundbreaking for Libby Dam.

Honorable Mike Mansfield
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C •

..
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Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Johns Hopkins University
(The George Huntington Williams Memorial Lecture)
Thursday, November 10, 1966, 4:00p.m.

VIET NAM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

I have come here from two weeks of politics in Montana.

Elections

in my State usually involve a great deal of personal exchange with voters.
This year was no exception.

Although not running myself, I found the cam-

paign as intensive as Montana is extensive.

It carried me into confronta-

tion with many, many Americans over a trail of thousands of miles.

I had

occasion to speak t o Montanans on the range, in the high mountains, along
the roads, at ranch and reservation, and in village, town, and city.
Political campaigning is not, as it might appear to be, an
exhausting pursuit.

On the contrary, at least to the politically sensitized,

it is a kind of restorative.

It reactiv/ ates the ability to differentiate

between what is important and what is grossly over-rated in the public
affairs of the nation.

That essential perspective, may I say, is fre-

quently distorted in the political prisms of

Washin~toi.

A campaign may be designed t o inform the voter but it also informs
the campaigner .

It unfolds the deep disquiets as well as the hopes which

move in the political substructure of the nation.

Each election campaign,

in short, is a rediscovery of the human side of American public life.

- 2 -

I meet with you fresh from an exposure to a cross-section of
American sentiment as it exists in Montana, where the frost has long been
on the pumpkin and the snows of winter have already begun to gather .

I

meet with you still strongly seized with what lies closest to the heart
of the people of my State .
I have found in 25 years of public life that on fundamental
matters , there is not much difference between a Montanal outlook and the
national outlook.

I assume, therefore, that the basic concerns of the

people of Montana are your basic concerns, just as basic hopes are also
probably similar .

In short, I assume that what is most important in

Montana is also likely to be most important here .
In that vein, I wish that I might say that the legislat ive
record of the 89th Congress or some specific aspect of it is of fundamental interest to Americans at this tine.

As you know, t he Senate and

House dealt with a great range of public problems during the past two
years.

These problems, having accumulated over a long time, had arisen

to challenge not only the stability of the nation's political and social
structure but even the adequacy of the nation ' s physical environment .
In my judgment, a very substantial legislative base has now been
laid for meeting these problems.
indeed, extraordinary in scope .
be apt .

The record of the 89th Congress

is,

The cognomen, "Great Congress" may well

In any event, as a participant, I s hould like to think so.

- 3 Yet, in all honesty, I cannot claim that the legislative achievements of these two years are a response to what is most basic in the
concerns and hopes of the people of the nation.

I regret to say that

these achievements, however significant, are obscured in the shadow wtich
Viet Nam has cast over every aspect of the life of the nation.
The preoccupation of Americans remains VietNam and its implications.

Every day, these implications grow more personal and direct for

more youth and their families.

The war is clearly the nexus of the national

anxiety.

And peace lies at the heart of the nation's hopes; peace--its

honorable

restora~ion

at the earliest possible moment.

I know that you have heard a great deal of Viet Nam over many
months.

It is a subject from which you might welcome a measure of surcease.

By the same token, I would prefer to consider some other less vexing
question, perhaps even the outcome of the election.

Yet I am impelled

to return to this critical matter tonight.
As you may know, problems of foreign relations have concerned me
for many years and, out of that concern, I have frequently addressed myself
to the Vietnamese question.

My views on the situation there are generally

known and I do not intend to repeat them in detail here.

Certainly, I have

said time and again--in public statements as well as in the private councils
of the government--that it does not matter much, at this late date, how we
became involved in Viet Nam.

The point is that we are involved, deeply involved,

and we cannot and we will not withdraw in the absence of an honorable settlement
of this question.

Nevertheless, I believe (and I have so stated many times)

that it would be to the benefit of all concerned if there could be an immediate
contraction of the hostilities and, as soon as possible thereafter, their
complete termination.

- 4 I have l ong been persuaded that the interests of the United States
categorize us as a Pacific power but that those interests most certainly do
not commend to us the role of Asian power .

As a Pacific power rather than

an Asian power (and the two are sometimes confused) it is, in my judgment,
wholly in our national interest to remove American military installations
and forces from the entire Southeast Asian mainland, as soon as that can
be done- -as soon as an honorable peace is assured.
May I say that that view accords with the President's proclaimed
purpose in VietNam which is a settlement achieved by negotiations.

At

Manila, moreover, the pledge was made that there would be a withdrawal
of American forces from VietNam within six months after a basis for
peace is established.

He has alluded, also, time and again, to the willingness

of the United States to remove American bases not only from VietNam but from
all of the Southeast Asian mainland.
This policy has not only been enunciated by the President; it has
been reiterated by his subordinates .

His Ambassador at the United

Na~ions,

for example, gave the President ' s policy its most comprehensive expression
in the flexible proposals for a Vietnamese peace which he made at the
opening of the current session of the General Assembly .
It has to be faced, however, that for all the words of peace, there
is not only an absence of peace but no visible prospect for its restoration
in the near future .

Those with whom we are locked in this deadly struggle

are either not persuaded of the honesty of our purpose in seeking the negotiation of an honorable peace or they are not interested in an honorable peace or
they define an honorable peace in concepts so different from our own that, at
this point, there is no basis for a reconciliation of positions .

- 5 May I add quickly that I assume that

so~e

such considerations

are involved, because there are no certainties as to why proffers of ne otiations have been rejected out of hand .

The fact is that in the absence of a

confrontation between all the participants--the direct and indirect participants --in this conflict, we cannot understand precisely the reasons for the
reluctance to open negotiations.

Nor can we define the dimensions of the

gap which must be bridged before peace can be re-established.
At this time, only one point is clear .

Despite the President's

obvious willingness to confer or to negotiate, we have found no such willingness on the part of North Viet Nam, the Southern National Liberation Front,
China, or the Soviet Union .

\·le

have been unable to enter into an exchange

with any participantSdirect or indirect in the Vietnamese war--except those
already in substantial sympathy or agreement with us .
And so, the echo of the words of peace is the continued din of
war .

The conflict in Viet Nam has not only failed to contr ct; it has

steadily expanded.

The process has been relentless .

ll the while, the

options have shrunk; the alternatives have grown fewer .
It is not yet clear what it will take to produce a flicker in
the lamp of peace, much less what will be required to end the war.

Until

the conflict is ended, however, it cannot be dismissed from our awareness .
It cannot be brushed aside in favor of more pleasant or tractable subjects.
It cannot be relegated by indifference to the inconsequential .

- 6 -

Viet Nam is, as I have stated, at the core of the concerns
and hopes of the people of the nation.

It involves, in a very pertinent

sense, the well-being of every living American and the future of the
United States.

It is interlaced with the interests of this nation in

Asia and the Pacific and throughout the world.
The war is already a hideous human tragedy for all concerned.
It has destroyed tens of thousands of lives and has put to the torch of
utter devastation an incalculable quantity of useful resources.

It has

already swept away many of man's most constructive works in VietNam,
north and south.
date.

It has brought this nation about 40,000 casualties to

It has required rising expenditures of public funds, and their

diversion from productive works.

In fact, the current costs of the

Vietnamese war are variously estimated as running between one and two
billion dollars a month.
Even more disturbing, the seeds of a much larger tragedy are
obviously implanted in the Vietnamese situation.
be confined to Viet Nam is far from assured.

That the conflict can

Actually, it already extends

into Laos and there is ever-present the possibility of its eruption into
a war of regional, continental or world-wide dimensions.
The conflict in Viet Nam may end, of course, long before it
matriculates into war with China or universal nuclear catastrophe.
is certainly the rational hope.

That

Whether or not it is an attainable hope

- 7 -

is another matter .

In any event, the Vietnamese conflict now, today,

already has the capacity to shake the precarious base of civilized human
survival.

That will continue to be the case until the war begins to yield

to rational settlement .
Whatever else it is, therefore, the war in Viet Nam is a most
urgent '·rarning to all nations .

It flashes a danger signal with respect

to the adequacy of the present international instruments of peace .

These

instruments have not only failed to prevent a breakdown of peace in Viet
Namj they also appear incapable of restoring peace in any prompt and
generally acceptable fashion .
It is high time , therefore, to note with emphasis that tne
structure of international order which has evolved during the past twenty
years is , to say the least, dangerously haphazard .

As it is now, each

state has its own formula for safeguarding the security of its people .
Each state tends to blend into that formula, in various combinations, a
supply of unilateral military power and a participation in a variety of
bilateral and regional defense arrangements.

Each nation adds to this

mixture its own version of traditional diplomacy and modern variations
thereon .

Almost all nations complete the blend with a dash of the United

Nations .
Of late, the role of the United Nations has become less and
less pronounced .

Indeed, with respect to VietNam the U. N. presence

is s carcely discernibl e .

It is true that the distinguished Secretary- General,

- 8 -

U Thant, has taken public note of the conflict in Viet Nam and its dangers
to the world.
diplomat.

The Secretary-General is a man of peace and an exceptional

He has made clear that he is more than willing to place his

dedication and his skills at the disposal of the disputants in Viet Nam.

------

In his diplomatic role, he has outlined views which might provide at some
point a basis for a settlement of the conflict and he has, otherwise,
sought tactfully to engage the interest of various parties in a settlement.
With all due respect, however, the sincere efforts of the
Secretary-General are hardly to be equated with bringing to bear on this
situation the potentials of the United Nations.

Viet Nam is, clearly, a

breakdown in the peace within the meaning of the Charter.
clearly, the threat of an expanding war.

It contains,

With these characteristics, it

would appear that the conflict should long since have triggered the
utilization of every resource of the United Nations in an effort to restore
peace.

Yet, I regret to say, that apart from the personal efforts of the

Secretary-General, the U. N. reaction to Viet Nam has had something of the
character of that of a disinterested, enervated or impotent on-looker.

It

is almost as though the conflict in Viet Nam were taking place not on the
other side of this planet but rather on some other planet entirely.
It may be, of course, that the
tion to peace in Viet Nam.

u.

N. is unable to make a contribu-

It may also be, however, that the failure to

seek a contribution from the U. N. is a missing link in the restoration of
peace in Viet Nam.

- 9 Whatever may be involved, the non-role of the United Nations in
this situation ought not to go unnoticed .

~n

embarrassed silence is no

longer a sufficient response to the nation 1 s needs or to tr.e world 1 s needs .
Urgent though it is, there is
the wur in Viet Nam .
conflict .

mo~e

involved in these needs even th n ending

There is also at stake the prevention of a more monstro s

There is also at stake the continued credibility and utility of

what has heretofore been a fundamental instrument in the structure of world order .
In my judgment, it is high time to face up to the conspicuous
absence of the U. N. from the Vietnamese dispute .

We need to ask why, when

the need for a peace - effort is maximal, the output of the U. N. is minimal .
And we need, at the same ti .e, to explore every possibility for the en age ment of the organization in the effort to bring about a teroination of the
hostilities in Viet Nam .
The U. N. was
cease -fire .

a~

essential element, among others, in the Korean

#by, then, its inconsequence in the problem of VietNam?

In

this connection, it is manifest that there have been striking changes in
the structure of

~he

U. N. since the Korean conflict.

Whatever their virtues,

it may be that these changes inhibit the engagement of the organization
in Viet Nam .
The most sweeping change, of course, is that the U.P . has
a General Assembly -oriented organization at the same ti e
ship has grown to over 120 states .
there were 51 united nations .

beco~e

that the member -

It will be recalled that originally

Among the present members, there are, as there

have been since the outset, states-infinitesimal and states-in@ense and, in
between, all of the gradations .

- 10 There are enormous differences of significance among these states
insofar as the practical problems of maintaining peace are concerned.
all 120 have equal access to available time in the General Assembly.
have an equal share in the control of the purse.

Yet,
All 120

All 120 have an equal vote

in decisions of the Assembly.
It is hardly an overstatement to note that the structure of the
General Assembly is appallingly cumbersome.

Nevertheless, the Assembly has

made and it can continue to make important contributions of a long-range and
peripheral nature to the strengthening of world peace.

With all due respect,

however, there is doubt that a body constituted as the General Assembly now
is can play a significant--an executive--role in dealing with imminent threats
of war or in the re-establishment of a peace that has broken down.
judgment, the General Assembly is not competent for that purpose.

In my
In my

judgment, it is delusive, at this time, to expect it to discharge functions
of a kind which might be helpful in Viet Nam.
It is conceivable that alterations in the structure of t he General
Assembly might remedy its inadequacies for peace-keeping or peace-restoring
purposes.

Francis Plimpton, a former U.

s.

representative to the U. N. was

right, perhaps, when he suggested that the organization was in need of "family
planning."

It might be that the use of a single spokesman for groups of small
states
states would be helpful. It might be, too, tha:t the clustering of smaller/ into

one vote on some power-projected formula would be helpful in insuring fiscal
responsibility and a measure of realism in the significant political decisions
of that body.

I have no doubt that there are any number of technical changes

which, given sufficient time, can be absorbed to great advantage i nto the
structure of the General Assembly.

.·
- ll But in all frankness, I must say that insofar as Viet Nam is concerned, there is not a sufficient margin of time .

Moreover, it is not at all

certain that the kind of wholesale reconstitution of the General Assembly
which 1-TOuld give it a peace-keeping function in Viet Nam and similar situations
is either practical or desirable.

As I have already noted, the General Assembly

has other useful, long-range and peripheral functions of peace .

Its value for

those purposes should not be jeopardized by projecting it into situations for
which it ifas not designed and for which it would ha e to be severely reshaped
if it is to be effective .
It seems to Tie practical, therefore, to look elsewhere in the U.
structure for a significant contribution to the restoration of peace in Viet
Nam .

The Charter clearly indicates that, veto or not, we should look first

to the Security Council .

It may be valid to assume that the Security Council

is less useful as an instrument of peace-keeping
disagreement .

If

en permanent powers are in

But it is not at all valid to assume that the uecurity Council

is useless in those circumstances .

That the Security Council may not be able

to play the central role in questionsof peace does not rule out its playing
of any role .
Hhatever differences may separate them vrit

respect to Viet Nam,

the permanent powers of tne Security Council, I believe, have all expressed
their grave concern vith the situation and the urgent need to do something
about it .

That is an entirely adequate basis, it seems to me, on which to

turn to the Council and seek from it a contribution to the restoration of
peace in Viet Nam .

- 12 -

Let me make clear that miracles are not to be expected.

All that

can reasonably be asked is a wholehearted effort to do what can be done to
further peace.

The least that should be expected, or accepted, it seems to

me, is a 1·rillingness on the part of the Council to confront the issue of Viet
Nam and to confront it soon .
One cannot foresee, of course, what can be most helpfully done by
the

u.

N.

What ought to be clear at this point, however, is that doing noth-

ing in the U. N. has not helped in VietNam.

There are discernible lines of

possible U. N. contribution which, it -vrould seem, warrant •llliil-lr the fullest
exploration .
One of these lines, for example, leads from the Security Council to
the International Court.

All of the combatants in Viet Nam have affirmed, I

believe, the fundamental relevance of the Geneva Accords of
for settlement of the conflict.

1954 as the basis

Certainly, the United States has done so.

We need to know, authdt'itatively and impartially, vhat the requirements may be in current circumstances for the reassertion of the Geneva Accords
as a legal basis for a restoration of peace.

We need to know, too, what must

be done sooner or later by all the parties directly or indirectly involved in
the Vietnamese conflict to comply with the Geneva Accords and so establish
conditions for a just and acceptable peace.

In the circumstances, therefore,

it might be useful for the Security Council to ask an advisory opinion of the
International Court on these questions.
It would seem to me, too, that the Security Council is an appropriate
setting for a cards on-the-table consideration of the present positions of all
the participants--direct or indirect--and those deeply interested in the conflict in Viet Nam.

Certain of the states such as the United States, the

- 13 Soviet Union and France are present as permanent members of the Council.
The problem of participation of the others is not insurmountable in the
light of the experiences in the Korean case .

In that irntance, it will be

recalled, an invitation was issued to Peking--a non-member of the U. N. --to
come to the Security Council and Peking did present its case and participate
briefly in its discussions .
If a consideration of the question of Viet Nam before the Security
Council is to have maximum utility, there needs to be present not only the
Soviet Union, France, the United States and other Security Council members
but also China and North Viet Nam and the I ational Liberation Front, as well
as Saigon .

In a confrontation of this kind, we may begin, at last, to under-

stand whether it is distrust, disinclination, disdain, density, or whatever
which has so far stood in ihe vray of negotiations for an honorable settlement .
We may begin, at last, to measure rather than guess the gap which must be
bridged in the restoration of peace in Viet

am .

To be sure, the prospects of a refusal of the invitation are obvious .
To be sure, the prospects of a high decible of propaganda and invective, if
the invitations are accepted, are equally obvious .

But these are risks which

can readil y be sustained when the stakes for all concerned are as high as
they are in Viet Nam.

Insofar as the United States is concerned, it is in the

interest of this nation to welcome the confrontation .

The open bar of forld

opinion is one before which vre must never he sitate or fear to place this
nation ' s policies .

- 14 The courses which I have indicated are illustrative of the possibilities of using the untapped resources of the United Nations to advance tmrards
peace in Viet Nam .

They may or may not be relevant at this time.

effort on the part of the

u.

A vigorous

N. may prove as futile as all other efforts to

date, military and non-military, to terminate the conflict .

But with the

world enmeshed in the most dangerous international situation since Korea, we
must seek by every avenue to facilitate the restoration of a just peace in
Viet Nam .

We owe that to the unfortunate people of that nation, to ourselves

and to the 'mr ld •
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December

27,

1966

Honorable Clinton P. Anderson
Chairns.n, Ccmnittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr . Chairman:
The gree.t volume of legislation which has been enacted during the
past few years has set in motion new federal programs which have been designed
to corr sJX>nd to the nation's changing needs. There canes to mind , for example, such measures as medical car for the aged, expanded health research,
programs for curbing water and ir pollution and for safeguarding the natural
heritage of' America, the effort to insure equality of treatment of' all citizens ,
the acts which seek to deal with urban blight and unrest and the decay of vast
rural areas and the many programs for the improvement of education .
So much basic legislation was enacted in the 88th and 89th Congresses
that I do not anticipate requests for sweeping new legislative approaches in
the ~th Congress. That is not to say that all that confronts us in the session
ahead. will be the need to pass appropriation bills and then adjourn . It occurs
to me that the next Congress will also see the convergence of' a unique opportunity with a great n ed for a concentrated Senate exercise of the oversight
function .
I would hope to see, in the first session of' the 90th Congress, the
beginning of' a major re-examination of what we have done in legislation during
the past few years. Considering the vast scope of' this work and the unprecedented nature of much of it, it is to be expected th t there exists a number
of rough edges , over-extensions and overlaps and, perhaps , even significant
gaps . A thorough and dispassionate re-study of' this legislation, therefore ,
could lead to desirable refinements.
What applies to programs which w have set in motion in recent years,
in my judgment, applies with equal emphasis to those of' older vintage . There
come to mind, in this connection, legislation on the military draft, agricultural subsidies of one kind or another, foreign aid, income and other taxes
and Jl8ny others . Few if any of these older legislative structures have had a
thorough-going, second·look for many years . These, too, it seems to me , might
profitably be subject to canplete re-study by the Senate . That kind of study
could provide not only a basis for adjustments of legislation, as necessary,
to the current needs of the nation but also a check on the equity and efficacy
of the administrative interpretations and practices which have developed .

In short, what is suggested is t.hat th Carmittee Chairmen consult
with the
bers of their c
itt s to determine with respect to matters
within th ir camnittee jurisdiction what, in th ir judaJnent, might be most
usefully ubjected
thorough oing over ight at this time. To put 1t
another WO¥, I am s
sting t.hat c
itt
initiate on behalf' of the Senate
a cone ntrated re-exemination of
or 1 islative structure by which the
federal govenwent is e bled to pl~ 1t role in th current life and affairs
of the na"ion and th world. I do not anticipate much more than a b inning
uring the caning s s ion.
t the tim s
to me to b v ry ripe for such
a b inning.

With all be t wishes for the caning year e.nd

per ona.1. regards,

I

Sincerely yours,
/s/ Mike Mansfield
same letter sent to Committee Chairman:
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Senator James 0 . Eastland
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Senator B. Everett Jordan
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